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GAYS IN THE MILITARY-THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS FAILS TO SUBJECT "DON'T ASK, DON'T
TELL" TO A STRICT SCRUTINY TEST:
WITT V. DEPARTMENT OF THE AR FORCE
GENEVRA WILLIAMS*
WITT V. Department of the Air Force centers on the appropriate
standard of review to apply when the military's Don't Ask,
Don't Tell (DADT) policy' infringes on the liberty of homosexu-
als.2 There are three commonly referenced levels of judicial re-
view: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the rational basis
test.' The Witt court held that an intermediate level of scrutiny
applies to cases involving DADT.4 The plaintiff in this case, a
highly respected and decorated Air Force nurse, claimed that
her equal protection, substantive due process, and procedural
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.B.A. 2001, the University of Iowa. The author would like to thank her husband
and daughter for their love and support.
I 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000). The statute requires expulsion of members of the
military who engage or attempt to engage in homosexual acts, or if they state or
indicate that they are homosexual or bisexual. Id. § 654(b). There are scenarios
under which service members will not be expelled, for instance, if the "conduct is
a departure from the member's usual and customary behavior." Id.
§ 654(b) (1) (A). However, none of those exceptions are relevant to this case.
2 Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2008).
3 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008). Strict scrutiny is
used when a fundamental right or liberty interest is impacted and requires the
law in question to be "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental
interest" in order to survive. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997); see also
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). In contrast, a rational basis
test simply requires that "an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the
classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to
the members of the disadvantaged class." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985). Intermediate scrutiny lies somewhere in between.
Clark v.Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 567-68 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We have no established criterion for
'intermediate scrutiny'. but essentially apply it when it seems like a good idea
to load the dice.").
4 Witt, 527 F.3d at 819.
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due process rights were violated when she was suspended from
duty for violating DADT.5 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
remanded her substantive due process claim, holding that
DADT must be reviewed under an intermediate level of scrutiny;
it remanded her procedural due process claim, but dismissed
her equal protection claim.6
Major Witt was in a relationship with another woman for six
years; they lived together approximately 250 miles away from
her base.7 Major Witt never discussed her sexual orientation
with anyone in the military, she never had sex on duty or on
military property, and her partner had no connection to the mil-
itary whatsoever.' In 2004, the Air Force investigated an allega-
tion that she was a homosexual; later that year, she was
suspended.' In September 2006, a military board found her in
violation of DADT, and in 2007, the Secretary of the Air Force
ordered that Major Witt receive an honorable discharge. 10
This case originated in April 2006, in between the March start
of Major Witt's discharge proceedings and the military board
hearing in September.1" Major Witt sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief with the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington, arguing that the DADT policy "violates
substantive due process, the Equal Protection Clause, and proce-
dural due process."'" The district court dismissed the suit for
failure to state a claim under rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Major Witt appealed. 3
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of
Major Witt's equal protection claim because it failed to with-
stand a rational basis review. 4 Additionally, the court held that
her procedural due process claim was not yet ripe and re-
manded that claim. 5 Her substantive due process claim was
5 Id. at 809-10.
6 Id. at 821-22. Note that this case note focuses its critique solely on the
court's handling of the substantive due process claim.
7 Id. at 809-10.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 809.
10 Id. at 810. Despite this order, Major Witt has not yet been formally dis-
charged. Id. at 812.
1 Id. at 810.
12 Id. at 811.
13 Id. at 809.
14 Id. at 821-22 (citing Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1424-25 (9th Cir.
1997)).
15 Id. at 812-13.
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similarly remanded, but with the instruction to analyze DADT's
impact on Major Witt in light of an intermediate level of
scrutiny.16
The military's DADT policy generally requires expulsion of
openly gay service members and has historically been reviewed
under a rational basis test. 7 However, the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Lawrence v. Texas' requires a new approach "when the
government attempts to intrude upon the personal and private
lives of homosexuals."' 9 In that case, the Court struck down a
Texas law criminalizing consensual sodomy between adults be-
cause constitutionally guaranteed liberty rights allow all individ-
uals to choose what kind of relationships they want to engage in,
regardless of sexual orientation.20 In doing so, the Court over-
ruled its prior decision, Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld a simi-
lar Georgia statute. 1
The Witt court grappled with the application of the Lawrence
holding, particularly in light of the fact that the Lawrence opin-
ion did not explicitly discuss which standard of review it ap-
plied. 22 The Witt court noted that the Lawrence Court rejected
the Bowers holding because it "fail[ed] to appreciate the extent
of the liberty at stake,' 23 and reasoned that if the Lawrence Court
were applying a rational basis review "it [would] ha[ve] no rea-
son to consider the extent of the liberty involved. '24 The Witt
court also examined the types of cases on which Lawrence was
based, finding that they all employed a heightened level of scru-
tiny.25 Furthermore, the language of the Lawrence Court's ratio-
nale is more consistent with a heightened level of scrutiny.2 6
Lawrence noted "no legitimate state interest which can justify
16 Id. at 821-22.
17 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000); Witt, 527 F.3d at 803 (citing Holmes v. California
Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) and Philips, 106 F.3d at
1425-26).
18 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
19 Witt, 527 F.3d at 819.
20 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 578-79.
21 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
22 Witt, 527 F.3d at 813-18.
23 Id. at 817 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 817. "Notably, the Court did not mention or apply the post-Bowers case
of Romer v. Evans, in which the Court applied rational basis review to a law con-
cerning homosexuals." Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)); see, e.g.,
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26 Witt, 527 F.3d at 817.
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[the Texas statute's] intrusion into the personal and private life"
of homosexuals.2 7 The Witt court reasoned that if Lawrence ap-
plied a rational basis review, it would have no reason to discuss a
legitimate state interest because "any hypothetical rationale for
the law would do." 28
Having considered the language and approach of the Su-
preme Court as it ruled criminal anti-sodomy laws unconstitu-
tional, the Witt court concluded that DADT required a
heightened level of examination over rational basis, yet it
stopped short of using a strict scrutiny analysis. 29 Instead, it ap-
plied an intermediate level of scrutiny, adopting a three-factor
analysis: (1) "[A] court must find that important governmental
interests are at stake"; (2) the intrusion "will significantlyfurthed'
those interests; and (3) the intrusion must be "necessary to fur-
ther those interests" and that there is no less intrusive alterna-
tive available which will "achieve substantially the same
results. ' 30 In deference to Congress's right to manage the mili-
tary, the court acknowledged that the first factor was satisfied by
the law's stated purpose of protecting unit cohesion, but re-
manded the case to develop the record on the second and third
factors.3'
Judge Canby dissented from the majority on the equal protec-
tion claim and on the level of scrutiny required for Major Witt's
substantive and procedural due process claims. 2 He believed
that Lawrence treated private, consensual, sexual relationships
between adults as a fundamental right, "firmly protected by the
substantive guarantee of privacy-autonomy of the Due Process
Clause."33 Consequently, in his view, DADT's infringement of
27 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
28 Witt, 527 F.3d at 817.
29 Id. at 817-18. "[W]e hesitate to apply strict scrutiny when the Supreme
Court did not discuss narrow tailoring or a compelling state interest in Lawrence."
Id. at 818.
30 Id. at 818-19. The court adopted these factors from a four-factor test used
by the Supreme Court in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003). Id.
That case dealt with the forcible administration of medication to a mentally-ill
criminal defendant, and the fourth factor, whether the drug was medically appro-
priate, is inapplicable in the instant case. Id.
31 Witt, 527 F.3d at 821. The DADT policy includes a number of congressional
findings, one of which states that the presence of homosexuals in the military
"would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order
and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability." 10
U.S.C. § 654(a) (15) (2000).
32 Witt, 527 F.3d at 822 (Canby, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 823.
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that right requires a strict scrutiny level of review for the sub-
stantive due process claim. 4
The Ninth Circuit was correct to recognize that rational basis
is no longer an appropriate level of scrutiny for DADT and simi-
lar claims; however, the court stopped too short.15 Issues sur-
rounding homosexuality are laden with deeply held beliefs. 6
Over the past fifty years, there has been groundswell of recogni-
tion in the United States and other western nations that "liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex" regard-
less of sexual orientation. 7 Laws that infringe on fundamental
rights must pass the test of strict scrutiny. 8 While the Court
stops short of specifically saying that this is a fundamental right,
the language of the Lawrence opinion leaves little room for
doubt:
[S]tatutes [criminalizing homosexual conduct] do seek to con-
trol a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to for-
mal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to
choose without being punished as criminals.
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the
State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to
set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institu-
tion the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults
may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dig-
nity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in in-
timate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
34 Id. Judge Canby also disagreed with the majority's view that Philips man-
dated dismissal of the equal protection claim because the Philips decision was
rooted in Bowers, which was "unequivocally overruled" by Lawrence. Id. at 824.
35 Id. at 822-24.
36 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003). "For many persons these are
not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and
moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of
their lives." Id.
37 Id. at 571-72. The Supreme Court notes that the 1995 Model Penal Code
does not recommend "criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations con-
ducted in private." Id. at 572. It also notes that just thirteen states criminalize
sodomy, down from all fifty in 1961, and those remaining states generally do not
enforce those statutes against consenting adults. Id. at 573. Great Britain, North-
ern Ireland, and the European Court of Human Rights have all moved away from
criminalizing homosexual conduct in the last fifty years. Id.
38 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766-67 (1997).
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protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the
right to make this choice.39
In fact, the majority opinion in Witt quotes compelling lan-
guage from Lawrence and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,4 which
makes it difficult to understand why it failed to conclude that
choices regarding sexual conduct are a fundamental right:
"Homosexuals' right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without in-
tervention of the government. It is a promise of the Constitu-
tion that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter."'" The dissent correctly stated that
"Lawrence effectively establishe [d] a fundamental right without
so labeling it." '4 2 Even if the majority did not see Lawrence as a
mandate, it certainly had the opportunity to give intimate rela-
tionships between consenting adults the status it deserves and it
is unfortunate that the court chose not to take advantage of this
opportunity.4"
If homosexual relationships, as well as heterosexual relation-
ships, were recognized as a fundamental right, DADT would
have to pass a strict scrutiny test in order to survive a constitu-
tional challenge.44 Congress has concluded that homosexuals in
the military are a risk to unit cohesion4 5 and although deference
should be given to statutes regarding military management,
"deference does not mean abdication. ' 46 Rationalizing DADT
based on biases and bigotry is inappropriate.4 ' Granted, requir-
ing strict scrutiny of DADT claims would have a profound and
immediate impact on the military. However, at a time when
the military is conducting two wars and struggling to recruit new
39 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
40 55 U.S. 833 (1992).
41 Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotations omitted).
42 Id. at 825.
43 "At the very least, Lawrence leaves the question open, to permit [the court] to
recognize [it as a] fundamental right." Id.
44 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766-67 (1997).
45 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2000).
46 Witt, 527 F.3d at 821 (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
47 The Witt dissent aptly notes that while "[p]rivate biases may be outside the
reach of the law,... the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." Id. at
826 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
48 "Few laws survive [strict] scrutiny, and DADT most likely would not." Id. at
817.
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service members,4 the benefits of its voidance may well offset
any detriments. In fact, polls suggest that most Americans be-
lieve DADT is no longer necessary.5° Take Major Witt as a case-
in-point. The only way unit cohesion was negatively impacted by
her homosexuality was the Air Force investigation and her sub-
sequent discharge.A She was a decorated officer, literally a
"poster child" for the Air Force, yet the application of DADT
forced her out of the military at a time when there was a
shortage of nurses in the Air Force of Major Witt's caliber.52
The holding in Witt makes positive strides towards bringing
DADT under the more appropriate, strict scrutiny level of re-
view. It is encouraging to see the impact of the Lawrence deci-
sion, prompting the Ninth Circuit to overturn its earlier
application of rational basis and to now require an intermediate
level of scrutiny for claims arising under DADT. However, the
court still must take that final step and recognize the fundamen-
tal right of individuals to conduct private, intimate relationships
in a manner of their choosing, and to demand that DADT satisfy
the highest level of strict scrutiny.
49 See Lolita C. Baldor, Military Recruiting Bonuses Grow by 25 Percent, ABC NEWS,
Oct. 2, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/politics/wirestory?id=5940901.
The military continues to meet its recruiting goals each year, but does so by offer-
ing higher bonuses and accepting individuals who are older, less educated, and
have criminal backgrounds. See id.; Deroy Murdock, Don't Make Sense-A Policy
That Deserves a Dishonorable Discharge, NAT'L REv.,July 23, 2008, available at http://
article.nationalreview.com/?q=ODIiYjkwN2RkNWExMWE5OGQxMzA2ODNIZT
c5NTRhjY=.
5o See, e.g., Steve Chapman, 'Don't Ask'Rule's Serious Tradeoffs, CHI. TmB., Mar. 4,
2007, available at http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2007/mar/04/news/chi-
0703040578mar04. According to a poll, fifty-five percent of Americans believe
gay persons should be able to openly serve in the military. Id. That number
shoots to sixty-four percent among individuals ages eighteen to thirty, which is
the military's target age group for recruits. Id. Despite the fact that only thirty
percent of current service members support accepting open homosexuals into
their ranks, seventy-five percent of those who have served in Iraq or Afghanistan
are "comfortable around homosexuals." Id. Of the subsection of troops who
know that they have gay colleagues, two-thirds do not feel that morale is nega-
tively impacted. Id. Notably, former Senator Sam Nunn, one of the original key
proponents of the policy, now feels that "it's appropriate to take another look at
it" and twenty-eight retired admirals and generals have pushed for Congress to
repeal the statute. Murdock, supra note 49.
51 Witt, 527 F.3d at 810.
52 Id. at 809-10. Major Witt was featured in Air Force promotional materials
for many years. Id.
,4LAS, it*
